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Boston Chamber of Commerce 

BUREAU OF 
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL AFFAIRS 

MELVILLE D. LIMING, Manager 
ZORA P. WILKINS, Assistant 

Org-anized to co-operate with existing establishments 
in promoting better management methods; to bring to 
Boston and New England additional industries and greater 
volume of trade, and to furnish reliable information regard- 
ing industrial conditions. 

Personnel of the Committee on Commercial and Indus- 
trial Affairs: 

Howard Coonley, Chairman, Walworth Manufacturing 

Company 
Philip R. Allen, Bird & Son, Inc. 
Charles S. Big-sby, C. S. Bigsby Company 
Fred I. Brown, Brown-Howland Company 
Harry L. Brown, Waltham Watch Company 
Durward E. Burchell, Graduate School of Business Admin- 
istration, Harvard University 
Charles E. Burleigh, General Electric Company 
Henry S. Dennison, Dennison Manufacturing Company 
Harry B. Gilmore, Western Electric Company 
Robert A. Leeson, Universal Winding Company 
Norman H. Mayo, Aberthaw Construction Company 
Edgar C. Rust, E. H. Rollins & Sons 

Acknowledgments are made to Current Affairs, the Bostonian 

Society, the Atheneum, the Boston Evening Transcript and the 

New England Historic Genealogical Society for the loan 

of plates and photographs. 



Copyright 1922 

Bureau of Commercial and Industrial Affairs 

Boston Chamber of Commerce 






THE BOSTON FIRE 

November 9, 1872 



BUREAU OF 
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL AFFAIRS 



BOSTON CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ^ 



F]3 



FACSIMILE FROM "REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED 

TO INVESTIGATE THE CAUSE AND MANAGEMENT OF 

THE GREAT FIRE IN BOSTON." 

Slalemetit of the ninnher of Engines, Hose, and IFoolc Jf Ladder, Carriages, with 
the nuraler of Men and amount of Hose that attended the great Fire of Nov. 0th, 
from out of town. 









Hose 


Hook Si Lad- 




Feet 


Chief Engineer. 


City or Town. 


Engines. 


Com- 


der Com- 


Men. 


of 








panies. 
2 


panies. 

1 


75 


Hose. 


P. II. Raymond .... 


Cambridge, Mass. 


3 


1,500 


Win. E. Di'l.ino .... 


Charleslown, " 


2 


3 





60 


2,000 


SamiR'l Iliitcliins . . . 


Chelsea, " 


1 


2 





85 


1.000 


W. W. Kimball .... 


Lynn, '• 


2 


2 





^7 


1,400 
2,000 


D. B Lord 


Salem, " 


2 
1 


1 
1 






67 

n 


LiilhiT Ladd 


Lawrence, " 


700 


jMlred Kenrick.jr. . . 


Brookline, " 


1 (hand) 


1 


1 


69 


1,100 


C A. Bc-lford ...... 


W. Koxbury, " 


2 


1 





21 


1,200 


James R. Hopkins . . 


Somerville, " 


1 


3 





60 


1,200 


A. D. Drew 


Watertown, " 


1 


1 





21 


800 


K. M. lAicas 


Newton, " 


2 


2 





51 


1.750 


8. E. Combs 1. 


Worcester, " 


2 


3 





60 


3.800 


Thomas J. Borden . . 


Fall Kiver, " 


2 


4 





60 


2.200 


Onslow (iilmore . . . 


Stonehara, '* 


1 


1 





18 


850 


T. \V. Hough 


Maiden, <' 


1 


2 





64 


2,000 


John II. Morton .... 


Melrose, " 


2 


1 





15 


400 


Benj. 11. Sumner . . . 


Medford, " 


1 


2 





40 


1,000 


Cha.^^. II. Davis .... 


Wakefield, " 


2 (hand) 








8? 


750 


"NVm. 11. TLniple . . . 


Reading, " 


1 (hand) 


1 





105' 


600 


A. H. 1 lowland, jr. . . 


New 15edford, " 


1 


1 





26 


700 


ilarshail Parks .... 


Waltham, " 


1 


1 





14 


700 


Oliver K. Green .... 


Proviilence '' 


3 


3 





30 


1,700 


A. E. ileiulriek .... 


New Haven, " 


1 


1 





22 


900 


Daniel A. Delamoy . . 


Norwich. " 


2 


3 





166 


2,300 


S. L. Mar.ston 


Portsmouth. N. H, 


1 


1 





45 


1,100 


B. C. Kendall 


Manchester, '• 


2 


2 





63 


1.200 


( 


Biddeford, Maine. 





2 





175 


3,000 


) 


Started and got as far 
Portsmouth, N. 11. 












( 








1 12 




A. J. Cnmmings . . . 


Portland, 


1 


1 





1,000 


E. G. Parrotl, Com'dant 


Charlestown Navy Yard 


2 


2 


1 


81 


1.000 


T. 'J". S. 1-aidley. " 


Watertown Arsenal, 


1 


2 





25 


1,100 


E. P. Davis. Chief Eng. 


Hyde Park, 


1 


i 





55 


1,200 



©C1A6S1582 



(\A <• t 



er 



o) 



i The Great Boston Fire 



ByJOHNW.DECROW 



NOVEMBER 9th and 10th will 
mark the fiftieth anniversary 
of the Great Boston Fire of 
1872, by far the worst conflagration 
which has ever visited the city and 
which before it was subdued had 
travelled over an area of about sixty- 
five acres in the heart of the city, 
had consumed more than seven hun- 
dred and fifty buildings, and caused 
a loss approximating seventy-five mil- 
lions of dollars. 

To the great majority of our active 
business men of today, the fire is but 
a hazy story, the details of which are 
little known. In the popular mind 
there are two outstatyJing features — 
the fire started in a hoop skirt fac- 
tory and the horses in the city, in- 
cluding those of the fire department, 
were suffering from an epidemic of 
sickness called "epizootic." 

Boston in 1872 was a city of some- 
thing over 250,000 persons but in con- 
sidering these figures we must re- 
member that Charlestown, "West Rox- 
bury including Jamaica Plain, Bright- 
on and Hyde Park were independent 
municipalities so that for comparison 
with the present day population we 
must include the population of these 
places which will bring the figures, 
according to the census of 1870, up 
to 296,635. 

It may be interesting in order to get 
a true viewpoint of the growth of 
Greater Boston in the last half cen- 
tury to know the population of some 
of the closely adjacent municipalities, 
according to the figures of the census 
of 1870 and census of 1920, the figures ■• 
before the dash being the population 
in 1870, the figures after the dash be- 



ing the population in 1920. Brookline 
6,650—37,748; Cambridge 39,634— 
109,694; Somerville 14,685—93,091; 
Chelsea 18,547—43,184; Everett 2,220 
—40,120; Maiden 7,367—49,103; Re- 
vere 1,197—28,823; Milton 2,683—9,- 
382. 

Boston's figures are 748,060 accord- 
ing to the 1920 census so that by the 
same comparison Boston's own 
growth has been from 296,635 to 748,- 
060. Electric cars, automobiles and 
the telephone, all of which have 
played a part in this concentration 
of population and all of which are 
now an important part of our every 
day life, were then unheard of. 

Nearly all the streets in the sec- 
tion of the city devastated by the 
fire were narrower than they are to- 
day. Franklin Street extended only 
from Washington Street to Federal 
Street, and Hawley Street was a nar- 
row lane. Fort Hill had been levelled 
but was not built over. Post Office 
Square did not exist. The Post Of- 
fice was in the Merchant's Exchange 
Building on State Street where the 
present Exchange Building now 
stands. The westerly portion of the 
present Post OflSce building was ap- 
proaching completion and played a 
part in checking the fire on one side. 
Evidence of this may be seen to- 
day in the chipped granite block be- 
low the memorial tablet on the Dev- 
onshire and Milk Street corner. 

The business section of the city 
had been gradually extending toward 
the south, and Summer Street, which 
■ but a few years before had been a 
residential section, more or less 
.marked the southerly boundary of 




Courtesv of the" Atheneum 



The above Is a reproduction of an etching made by Sidney L. Smith 
of the building on the southeasterly corner of Kingston and 
Summer streets in 1872, in which the Boston Fire origi- 
nated. Only through the efforts of Harold Murdock, 
author of "1872 — The Great Boston Fire," was an 
old bill head of the firm of Tebbetts, Baldwin 
& Davis, finally secured with a picture 
of the structure engraved upon it. 



the wholesale district. Trinity Church 
stood on the corner of Summer and 
Hawley Streets partly on land which 
is now in Hawley Street and partly 
on land now occupied by Filene's. 
The streets leading to the south from 
Summer Street were partially occu- 
pied by brick dwellings used largely 
for boarding and lodging houses. The 
best of the business buildings were of 
brick or granite, many with French 
or Mansard roofs with wood finish. 

William Gaston was Mayor of the 
city. There was a Board of Alder- 
men of twelve members elected at 
large and a Common Council of sixty- 
four members elected four from each 
ward. The two bodies together were 
referred to as the City Council. The 
fire department was under the charge 
of a joint committee of the aldermen 
and common council; the fire alarm 
service was under the charge of an- 
other joint committee and the loca- 
tion of the apparatus houses was un- 
der the control of a third joint com- 
mittee. 

The Chief Engineer and the Assis- 
tant Engineers were elected annually 
by the City Council. John S. Dam- 
rell was the Chief Engineer and had 
held that office nearly seven years 
having previously served as an As- 
sistant Engineer. The apparatus of 
the department comprised twenty-one 
steam fire engines, each with a hose 
reel or "jumper." the steamers being 
mostly of small capacity compared 
with our present day standards; ten 
independent "hose companies"; sev- 
en "hook and ladder carriages"; and 
three extinguisher companies. This 
apparatus was manned by a total 
force of about 475 men of whom about 
90 were permanent men, that is, 
giving their whole time to the fire 
department and comprising an en- 
gineer, fireman and driver for each 
steamer, a. driver for each hook and 



ladder, independent hose and ex- 
tinguisher company, the hose reels 
of each steamer company, except in 
a few cases, being attached to and 
hauled behind the steamer. 

The balance of the force was made 
up of "call men", that is men who re- 
sponded from their homes and places 
of business upon an alarm of fire. Of 
the twenty-one steamers, six were lo- 
cated in the city proper, three in East 
Boston, three in South Boston, three 
in Roxbury and six in Dorchester, 
while of the seven hook and lad- 
der carriages only two were in the 
city proper. 

At that time there was not a single 
piece of fire apparatus located in 
the burned district and, peculiarly 
enough, none has since been located 
actually within this area. The pay- 
roll of the department for the year 
1872 was approximately $224,000.00. 
Today the Boston Fire Department 
gives full time employment to about 
1400 men, of whom 1200 are the ac- 
tual fighting force, and has in service 
50 pumping engines, 3 fire boats, 30 
ladder trucks and numerous auxili- 
ary apparatus. The yearly payroll 
is now over $2,400,000.00 

The water service in the down 
town section was comprised in a sin- 
gle system of mains there being a 
twenty-four inch main in Washington 
Street from which a twelve inch main 
led through Bedford Street and down 
through to what was then Broad 
Street but is now Atlantic Avenue. 
This main continued on to State 
Street and came up State Street and 
connected again with the twenty-four 
inch main. The district lying inside 
was laid with six and eight inch pipes 
most of which had been down many 
years. 

The hydrants for fire purposes 
were of an old type, offset from the 
mains on four inch pipes, and hav- 



ing but one outlet so that only one 
steamer could be connected. In some 
cases the hydrants were many hun- 
dred feet apart. There were also 
scattered throughout the district 
quite a number of underground fire 
reservoirs supplied from the mains by 
four inch pipes. The main in upper 
Summer Street was a six inch main 
and was probably considerably re- 
duced in efficiency by rust. 

Today the district is gridironed 
with mains ranging from the thirty- 
six inch feeders down to twelve inch- 
es. Throughout the larger part of the 
district, there are three independent 
systems of mains, the so-called low 
service furnishing the general sup- 
ply of water for domestic, business 
and fire purposes; the so-called high 
sejrvice ordinarily furnishing water 
for automatic sprinklers, hyraulic 
elevators and like uses, but easily and 
quickly available for fire purposes; 
and the so-called high pressure fire 
service of recent installation and in- 
tended for and devoted entirely to 
fire purposes. This service delivers 
water at the hydrant at the necessary 
pressure for fire uses and when avail- 
able makes the use of portable pump- 
ing engines more or less unnecessary. 

As compared to a single six inch 
main in 1872, Summer Street today 
has all three services, a twelve inch 
low service main, a twelve inch high 
service main and a sixteen inch high 
pressure fire service main. Hydrants 
are now all of a modern type 
with three and four outlets and to a 
la^ge extent connected directly 'to 
the mains. 

As a result of the epizootic, the 
city for a time previous to the fire 
had been practically "horseless." 
Street car and bus lines had been 
forced to suspend and teaming 
of any sort had been substantially 
at a standstill. This condition of af- 
fairs made as much of an impression 



on the public mind at the time as a 
complete cessation of vehicle traffic 
for a long period would today, and it 
is not strange, therefore, that in tell- 
ing the story of the Great Fire it has 
many times been made to appear 
that the lack of horses to draw the 
fire apparatus was the reason for the 
fire getting its great headway. Di- 
rectly the Icck of horses seems to 
have had little bearing. Indirectly 
It may have had a considerable bear- 
ing. 

On October 26th, the Chief Engineer 
and his fifteen Assistant Engineers 
(corresponding to our present Deputy 
and District Chiefs) met at City Hall 
to consider means to provide for the 
safety of the city from fire during the 
epidemic. 

They decided to enroll five hundred 
temporary additional members of the 
department during the continuance 
of the epidemic and to pay them one 
dollar for each fire to which they 
properly responded and twenty-five 
cents an hour for the time they re- 
mained on duty at fires. This force 
was easily raised, for Boston was 
then not much more than a decade 
beyond the hand tub days when al- 
most everyone "ran with the ma- 
chine" on occasion. Drag ropes were 
attached to the various pieces of ap- 
paratus and the actual speed in the 
response to fires proved to be not 
much less than with horses. 

In itself the lack of horses does not 
appear to have been the cause of any 
great delay on the night of the Great 
Fire for with a few exceptions the ap 
paratus was hauled by man power 
almost as fast as it could have been 
with horses. On October 26th, the 
Chief Engineer and his fifteen As- 
sistant Engineers (corresponding to 
our present Deputy and District 
Chiefs) met at City Hall to consider 



THE BUMED DISTRICT. 

Th^ map below, prepared expressly for'the Daily Advertiser, represents the portion of 
tliecity burned over iu tbe recent conflagration, and its relation to tlie surroirndln? tei-ritoiv 




Tlie sliatled pr ition indicates the burnt district, 
riomlnent buildings wiiicli were not destroyed are 
disticguisbed by black/ The references are as 
"oUows: — 

A— Building in which the fire began. 

15— Ilerchants Exchange and rost-Office. 

('—New Post-Office. 

D— (;kl South Church.- 



E— Old State House. 
F— Custom-House. 
G— State-Street Bloclc. 
H— Fort inn. 
I— Faneuil Hall, 
J— Quincy Market. 
K-B. H. &*■ R- K-wliart 
L—Winthrop square. 



Courtesy of the Boston Transcript 

From The Boston Advertiser, November 11, 1872 



means to provide for the safety of 
the city from fire during the epidemic. 
That everything was not done per- 
haps which could have been done to 



provide serviceable horses for the ffe- 
partment is shown by the fact that 
by November 9th the horse railroads 
and bus lines had resumed operation, 



though on reduced schedules, express 
and teaming companies were doing 
business, and as early as October 30th 
a political parade had been held, in 
which over one hundred horses had 
been used. In spite of tbis improved 
condition only five of the city's steam- 
ers were drawn by horses on the 
night of the fire. 

At the same meeting on October 
26th, the Engineers also temporarily 
redistricted the city and rearranged 
the running card of the department, 
so that during the continuance of the 
epidemic the number of steamer com- 
panies responding to alarms of fire 
would be materially reduced and that 
on the first alarm only the hose reels 
of the steamer companies would be 
taken to the fire. 

The Engineers sent a request to 
the Police Department to have its 
officers, upon the discovery of a fire, 
investigate and find out if possible, 
whether the fire was above the sec- 
ond story of the building, and if it 
was above the second story to ring a 
second alarm without further orders. 
The second alarm would bring the 
steamers whose hose reels had al- 
ready responded and some additional 
steamers, but even then not the num- 
ber which would have responded to 
the first alarm under ordinary cir- 
cumstances. 

This seemingly unnecessary re- 
districting or rearrangement of 
the running card adopted by the 
Engineers as a temporary expedient 
during the epidemic was the cause of 
from five to ten minutes delay in 
response of three of the six down- 
town steamers at the Great Fire. The 
manner in which it actually worked 
out will appear later. 

The fire originated in the building 
at the south-easterly corner of Sum- 
mer and Kingston Streets on the site 
of the building now occupied by a Lig- 



gett Drug Store. The building had 
a fifty foot frontage on Summer Street 
and extended back along Kingston 
Street one hundred feet to a passage- 
way or alley fifteen feet wide on the 
other side of which was a five story 
brick building fronting on Kingston 
Street. 

The passage way still exists and 
the present building is similar in 
height and area to the structure 
destroyed. The building was con- 
structed of granite and had an ele- 
vator in the rear corner furthest 
from Kingston Street, the shaft 
being about five and one-half feet 
square, sheathed with wood and 
opening by a door and windows onto 
the passageway. 

The building was comparatively 
new, having been built in 1866, and 
represented the best type of con- 
struction of that time. The lower 
floor was occupied by the dry goods 
firm of Tebbetts, Baldwin & Davis; 
the second floor by Damon Temple 
& Co. dealers in men's furnishing 
goods, and the third and fourth floors 
and a part of the top floor by A. K. 
Young & Co., manufacturers of hoop 
skirts and bustles and dealers in cor- 
sets. 

How or when the fire started has 
never been determined. Presumably, 
from the evidence of various persons 
who saw it in its early stages, it 
started in the basement and went up 
the elevator shaft and mushroomed 
out through the various stories, prob- 
ably into the fourth and fifth stories 
first and then into the lower stories. 

Summer Street in the early evening 
was not the busy thoroughfare it is 
today but there is no doubt that the 
fire was seen by many persons long 
before an alarm was given. Two po- 
lice officers of the City of Charles- 
town standing on the Prison Point 
Bridge saw flames as early as 7:10 



p. M. and remarked that there was a 
fire in Boston. Several police officers 
and private watchmen were within 
a few hundred yards of the scene 
but not One happened to pass the 
building before the alarm was given. 
A number of the residents of King- 
ston Street heard the crackling of 
flames and saw the fire, some even as 
it started up the elevator shaft. As 
has happened many times before and 
since each one apparently thought 
that some one else had attended to 
the necessary duty of giving the 
alarm. Assistant Engineer Regan at 
his home on Columbia Street, heard 
cries of fire and it appears that he 
must have been at the fire as early 
as 7:15. 

It seems that he must have assumed 
or have been told by bystanders that 
an alarm had been given. Automatic 
fire alarms were unknown. Some 
human agency must give the alarm. 
The Fire Department perhaps at that 
time more than at any other period 
in its histcry was waiting and watch- 
ing for a fire, for without doubt the 
great majority of the five hundred 
additional men had finished their sup- 
pers and were not averse to the extra 
dollar which an alarm of fire would 
give some of them a chance to earn. 

It was not, however, until police 
officer Page, coming through Lincoln 
Street to Summer Street, saw the 
glare of the fiames over the Bedford 
Street buildings as he reached the 
corner and gave the alarm from Box 
52 at 7:24 P. M. Althoiigh he had 
not actually seen the fire, there seems 
to have been no doubt in his mind 
that it was above the second floor for 
he sounded the second alarm immed- 
iately after, or as it is officially re- 
corded, at 7:29 P. M. Steamer 7 on 



East Street and Hose 2 on Hudson 
Street had been notified of the fire 
by citizens and these companies were 
leaving their quarters as the bells be- 
gan to strike the first alarm. Steamer 
7's notification was that there was a 
fire on Bedford Street" and perhaps 
in the location of the fire thus given 
by the citizen who ran to East Street, 
and probably passed fire alarm box 52 
on the way, fate may have played a 
part, for Steamer 7 went to Bedford 
Street, took a hydrant and ran a line 
of hose through the yards and over 
the sheds of Bedford Street to the 
rear of the burning building. 

Hose 2 naturally came through 
Kingston Street and ran a line of 
hose from a hydrant at the corner of 
Kingston and Bedford Streets into 
the passageway at the rear and at 
first played into the basement of the 
burning building. Hose 2 appears to 
have had the distinction of getting 
"first water" on the fire. At this 
time the bulk of the fire must have 
seemed to be in the rear of the build- 
ing and the danger of a spread of 
the flames have appeared to be the 
brick building on the other side of 
the passageway. 

Fireman Cheswell of Steamer 4, 
destined later to become Chief of 
Department, heard the alarm while 
at his supper table and came from 
Harrison Avenue through Kingston 
Street. He, too, apparently thought 
the flght was to come in the passage- 
way to prevent the spread of the flre 
to the building at the rear for he saw 
a hydrant on Kingston Street oppo- 
site the burning building and ran 
through Otis Street to meet Steamer 
4's hose reel and guide it to that hy- 
drant, from where a line of hose was 
taken to one of the upper floors of 
the brick building. 



9 




Courtesy oj Bostoman Society 

Washington Street to Old South Church After the Fire 



10 



In this way, it happened that the 
first three pieces of apparatus to ar- 
rive concentrated their lines in the 
rear at the end of the building away 
from Summer Street. As it turned 
out, it was to be some minutes more 
before effective apparatus was to ar- 
rive on the Summer Street side. That 
Engineer Regan early appreciated the 
seriousness of the situation is evi- 
denced by his order to a police offi- 
cer soon after the first alarm "to have 
three more alarms rung," which, had 
it been literally carried out, would 
have resulted at once in a "general 
alarm" calling out practically all the 
apparatus in the city. 

There seems to be little doubt, 
though he knew that Chief Engineer 
Damrell or Assistant Engineer Green, 
also his superior, would not be long 
in arriving on the scene, that En- 
gineer Regan intended to take the re- 
sponsibility of ordering a general 
alarm. As a matter of (fact, the 
police officer apparently understood 
that a third alarm was wanted and as 
a result the third alarm was sounded 
at 7:34 P. M. 

It seems that fate decreed delay 
after delay in the chain of circum- 
stances that night, commencing with 
the tremendous delay in giving the 
alarm followed in some cases by a 
slightly slower movement of some of 
the apparatus, owing to lack of 
horses, and followed by an abnormal 
delay in starting for the fire by some 
of the steamers, which, under or- 
dinary conditions, would have re- 
sponded on the first alarm. 

To make this clear, it should be un- 
derstood that normally Steamers 3, 
4, 6, 7, 8 and 10 went to Box 52 on 
the first alarm. As it worked out that 
night, under the temporary rearrange- 
ment of the running card. Steamer 
7's hose reel and Hose 2 reached the 
fire as soon as they would have under 



any circumstances and Steamer 7 it- 
self started as the first alarm was 
ringing. As far as these companies 
were concerned, the redistricting 
caused no delay. Steamer 4's hose 
reel started on the first alarm but 
the steamer did not start until the 
second alarm was beginning to strike. 

Steamer 3 from Washington Street 
above Dover Street and Steamer 
10 from River Street saw the 
light of the fire and disregarding 
the running card, started right after 
the first alarm. Steamer 3 made ful- 
ly as good time as with horses while 
Steatner 10 was delayed perhaps 
a couple of minutes from the lack 
of horses. Steamer 8 started on the 
second alarm and Steamer 6 start- 
ed on the third alarm. In this 
way, it was twenty minutes after the 
first alarm before all of these six 
steamers were at the fire. Under or- 
dinary conditions, the last one should 
have been at the fire about as the 
third alarm was ringing. 

Whether the fire could have been 
checked before getting well across 
Summer Street, had all these steam- 
ers come on the first alarm, is en- 
tirely guess work, but there must 
have been a time, about when Chief 
Damrell arrived, when two or three 
steamer streams, had they been im- 
mediately available on Summer 
Street, might perhaps have changed 
the course of events. 

Chief Damrell came on foot from 
his home on Temple Street as soon 
as the first alarm struck, passing the 
corner of Beacon and Park Streets 
as the second alarm was sounding 
and probably reached the fire about 
as the third alarm was ringing. He 
described the fire as he first saw it 
in these words. 

"I say this, and wish to be dis- 
tinctly understood, that in my ex- 
perience in the Boston Fire Depart- 



11 



ment, covering twenty-five years, I 
never saw such a sight as was pre- 
sented that night; within eight min- 
utes from the time the alarm sound- 
ed, I was on the ground, and the 
building was literally consumed. I 
don't understand it today. It is a 
phenomenon which I cannot possibly 
fathom. With all the fires we have 
had in that district and other sec- 
tions of the city, for the past twenty- 
five years that I have been connected 
with the Fire Department, I never saw 
the time, no matter how inflammable 
the building was, whether it con- 
tained oils or any other inflamma- 
ble material, but what we could en- 
ter the building itself; but here was 
a case where you could not get near 
the building. On each side it was 
all on fire, through the Mansard roof, 
within eight minutes of the time that 
the alarm was given, — a sight I nev- 
er beheld before in this city or in 
any other where I have happened to 
be when there have been large fires." 

The Chief first went to the passage- 
way on Kingston Street and found 
the three lines of Steamers 4 and 7 
and Hose 2 at work. He then went 
back to Summer Street and found 
that the copings and roofs of the 
buildings opposite were smoking and 
commencing to burst into flame and 
that the Summer and Kingston street 
walls of the building where the fire 
started were beginning to crumble 
from the top. The fire had apparent' 
ly travelled through the upper stories 
from the rear of the building to S'um- 
mer Street with lightning rapidity. 

A line of hose from Hose 8 had 
been taken up the stairway in the 
front of the building and had gotten 
as far as the second floor. This was 
ordered out and the men who had 
made the venture had difficulty in 
escaping through the shower of gran- 
ite blocks and debris. 



Steamer 10 had arrived by this 
time and had taken a hydrant at the 
corner of Summer and Arch Streets 
but Steamers 6 and 8, with the punch 
that perhaps even then would have 
checked the northward progress of 
the fire, were still on the way. Chief 
Damrell apparently realized that the 
situation was the most critical that 
had ever confronted him for he or- 
dered the "general alarm" which 
started all the rest of the apparatus 
in the city on its way to the fire. 
The time was 7:45 P. M. 

Messengers had been sent to meet 
Steamers 6 and 8 and to direct them 
to their positions. Steamer 6 to the 
corner of Summer and Devonshire 
Streets and Steamer 8 to Winthrop 
Square. Every possible effort was 
to be made to confine the fire on the 
north side of Summer Street to the 
block bounded by Otis Street, Win- 
throp Square and Devonshire Street. 
Within a few minutes after the gen- 
eral alarm, Chief Damrell called on 
Cambridge and Chariestown for help. 
Even at this time *»e seems to have 
felt that he had a fair chance to stop 
the fire, but he had hardly completed 
his dispositions for massing the 
steamers when a shortage of water 
began to develop. 

As outlined above the water mains 
were small and the hydrants were 
far apart and of a type to which only 
one steamer could be attached. When 
Summer Street was a district of 
residences, a six inch main and 
these old fashioned hydrants had 
been ample, but now in their ef- 
forts to get water from this main, 
the steamers were literally robbing 
each other. Steamers stopped pump- 
ing that others, at points seemingly 
for the moment more critical, might 
have water. Even the underground 
fire reservoirs, fed from the mains 
as they v/ere by four inch pipes. 



12 



could not meet the demand of the 
steamers. 

The fire began to spread out and 
cross Devonshire and Otis Streets to 
the east and to the west, at the same 
time continuing its uninterrupted 
march northward and it was not long 
before it had reached such propor- 
tions that, even had there been water 
in plenty, there was not enough ap- 
paratus immediately available to cope 
with it. Not long after 8 o'clock 
Chief Damrell sent out wide spread 
calls for help so that as the night 
wore along, steamers, hose and men 
began to pour in, eventually from 
points as far away as New Haven, 
Conn., and Portland, Maine. 

By late afternoon on Sunday, 42 
steamers, 4 hand engines, 53 hose 
companies, 3 ladder trucks, about 
1700 men and 40,000 feet of hose had 
arrived in the city. 

The fire does not seem to have 
travelled as a solid wall of flame but 
went from building to building by 
catching here and there on the roofs 
and around the copings and windows 
and in some Instances by the burn.^ 
ing out of the timbers set in the 
comparatively thin brick walls. 

Chief Damrell as one means of at 
least partially checking its spread 
sent a request to the police depart- 
ment to organize fifty officers to 
break into stores and secure carpets 
and blankets and to use these In a 
wet condition to protect the roofs, 
copings and windows from the flame- 
generating heat. The police depart- 
ment, apparently because its forces 
were scattered and necessary to han- 
dle the great throngs which had col- 
lected, does not seem to have made 
any attempt to comply with this re- 
quest. 

That Chief Damrell's idea was a 
good one, however, is shown by the 
fact that Hovey's building was saved 



by members of the firm and employ- 
ees who used these tactics. The story 
of the saving of Hovey's building is 
too long to detail here, but as told 
by Mr. George Gardner it is well 
worth reading as an example of cour- 
age and faithfulness, and as showing 
how a very little water properly ap- 
plied can be made to have a great 
effect. 

The iron railing which can be seen 
along the front of the roof of Hovey's 
building today, and which was origi- 
nally placed there for protection when 
clearing the roof of snow, played a 
part that night in helping to keep the 
fire from the building. Buildings on 
the west side of Washington Street 
were also protected by the owners 
and tenants in much the same man- 
ner as Hovey's, so that the fire did 
not cross Washington Street. It 
seems possible to believe that if the 
Chief could have effected the organi- 
zation of citizens into "blanket" bri- 
gades they might perhaps have been 
effective in stopping the fire at other 
points. 

As it became apparent that the 
fire was beyond all hope of control 
by the fir- department, citizens be- 
gan to urge on the Mayor the necessi- 
ty of the use of gunpowder. Chief 
Damrell and his Engineers were al- 
most uniformly opposed on general 
principles to the use of gunpowder, 
but after consultation yielded to the 
demand and written authority was 
given by Chief Damrell to various 
citizens to "remove goods or blow up 
buildings" as their judgment might 
direct. A number of buildings were 
blown up or partly demolished, but 
the lack of suitable means for confin- 
ing the powder generally made the 
destruction very incomplete. The 
late Major Henry L. Higginson, then 
a comparatively young man, realized 
the enormitv of the situation and that 



13 




cq 



heroic measures should be taken and 
urged on the Mayor that a path 
where a stand could be made should 
be created by blowing up buildings in 
a line from Washington Street to the 
harbor and far ahead of the fire. 

The work was not done, however, 
in such a systematic manner nor by 
a prearranged plan, but was done by 
piecemeal here and there, the actual 
explosion being made in almost every 
case after the building mined had 
caught fire, so that in its final results 
gun powder played no large part in 
stopping the fire. 

Generally speaking, once the fire 
had gotten well across Summer Street 
and into Winthrop Square, there ap- 
pears to have been no definite con- 
certed plan to stop it. Lack of water 
prevented an effectual massing of 
steamers at Franklin Street where 
the width of that street furnished 
the best opportunity. The movement 
of the fire was in most respects one 
of steady progress although early in 
the evening it made one big jump 
when the Hartford and Erie Railroad 
Station at the foot of Summer Street 
and the wharves adjoining it caught 
fire from flying brands. 

The story of the travel of the fire 
from building to building and from 
street to street is too long to detail 
here and would be but a repetition. 
Suffice to say that it was after noon 
on Sunday when its continued ad- 
vance had been checked, with Hovey's 
Building standing near the southwest 
corner overlooking a desolate sixty- 
five acres of smoking ruins. Included 
in the buildings destroyed were 
seventy dwelling or lodging houses, 
twenty-eight of which were located, 
strange as it may appear to the 
younger business man of today, on 
Purchase Street. 

An accurate idea of the area burned 
over can be gained from the map 
on page 7, notice being taken of 



the fact that although the fire trav- 
elled the entire length of the south- 
erly side of Summer Street its ad- 
vance to the south was comparatively 
small and that on Kingston Street 
it was stopped after it had destroyed 
the building in rear of the building 
where it started. 

The wind blowing at from five to 
ten miles an hour held from ^ the 
north and northwest or in the gen- 
eral direction of South Boston, 
throughout the fire so that the fire 
presents the phenomenon of having 
burned against or across the wind 
over most of the territory con- 
sumed. The United States Signal 
Service officers in their report to 
the Chief of the Signal Service of 
the Army contrast this with the 
Chicago fire of the year previous 
where, with a strong wind blowing, 
the fire burned to leeward. 

The total loss was estimated by 
Thomas Hills, then Chairman of the 
Board of Assessors, as about $75,000,- 
000. As an example of increased 
land values, it appears that within 
a short time after the fire, land on 
Summer Street opposite Church 
Green, then assessed for $11.00, sold 
for $17.00 a square foot. Today land 
in that location is assessed for about 
$45.00 a foot. 

So far as building and street con- 
ditions before the fire were con- 
cerned, it is known that the English 
Underwriters after the Chicago Fire 
of the year previous had caused a 
survey to be made of the large Am- 
erican cities and had found condi- 
tions in the business section of Bos- 
ton such that at the time of the fire 
they were seriously considering tha 
cancellation of their risks. 

That Boston was not discouraged" 
by the disaster is evidenced by a 
walk through the district today and. 
an observance here and there of the,' 



15 




Courtesy of Boston'tan Socirty 

capstones of brick and granite build 
Ings bearing tlie figures 1873. In 
the rebuilding, however, no sub- 
stantial progress was made toward 
fire prevention, except as widened 
streets furnish better opportunities 
to stop a fire. As previously men- 
tioned, all the principal, streets were 
widened and straightened and Post 
Office Square created. Franklin 
Street which had extended only to 
Federal Street was cut through to 
Pearl Street, there to meet what had 
been Sturgis Street. A noticeable 
effect of the widening is seen today 
on the easterly side of "Washington 
Street, between Summer and Milk 
Streets, where a distinct set-back 
from the general building line of 
Washington Street is apparent and 
on the Summer Street end of Chaun- 
cy Street wliere the fire line is dis- 
tinctly marked. 

The i«ew buildings so far as fire 
resistance is concerned were in their 
individual characteristics somewhat 
more fire-retarding but in their en- 
tirety they presented little advance 
in the art of fire resistance, and it 
was not until structural steel and con- 
crete came into general use that we 



'anoramic 



>f the Bi 



began to approach a fire resisting 
construction. 

Since then the northerly end of the 
burned district has been fairly well 
for the second time rebuilt and this 
time with fire resisting structures 
with an uncomfortable sprinkling of 
the old type still scattered between 
the newer buildings. To the east 
in the section bounded by Ot=s and 
Devonshire Street on the west, 
Franklin Street on the north and 
Atlantic Avenue and Summer Street 
on the east and south, there is prac- 
tically no modern fire resisting con- 
struction. Of the area of down-town 
Boston not burned over in the Great 
Kire, the entire section to the north 
of State and Court Streets today pre- 
sents hardly an example of modern 
fire resisting construction. To the 
south and west of the burned area, 
we find more modern buildings, 
though comparatively widely scat- 
tered, among the old ones. 

Since 1872 the building code and 
the requirements of the Underwriters 
have brought into use many devices 
like automatic sprinklers and water 
curtains, automatic doors, wire glass 
and automatic fire alarms to prevent 



16 




d South Church on extreme left. 

and retard the rapid spread of fire. 
The personnel of the fire department 
is now a highly trained force, 
equipped with what appears to be a 
fairly ample supply of the best fire 
fighting machinery available. In 
short, both in men and apparatus, 
the Boston Fire Department is second 
to none. Of late years, it has been 
highly successful in handling down 
town fires, so that a fire which burns 
out one of these old buildings is a 
rarity. 

As compared to Chief Damrell's 
situation fifty years ago when it took 
him nearly two hours to get his 
twenty-one steamers to work, the 
present Chief with normal conditions 
could mass almost fifty pumping en- 
gines on Boston Common in less than 
half an hour, could summon almost 
as many more from other cities and 
towns within an hour, has ample 
mains and hydrants with which to 
supply those engines, has also 
throughout the central part of the 
city the new high pressure fire serv- 
ice capable of supplying under prop- 
er pressure for fire service 10,000 
gallons of water a minute and eventu- 
ally to be capable of supplying 20,000 



gallons a minute, has deck guns and 
water towers which control and di- 
rect streams which men unaided by 
these devices could not control or 
direct. Yet when asked whether 
a repetition of the Great Fire could 
occur today he laconically replied 
"Nothing is impossible." 

In this reply he was probably 
guided by the fact that most great 
fires are the result of an unforseen 
combination of circumstances and a 
sometimes almost unbelievable chain 
of events. As a matter of fact, 
however, it does not seem probable 
that a fire covering such an area 
could occur again unless it be to the 
north of State Street. The loss in 
1872 over an area of sixty-five acres 
was not over seventy-five million dol- 
lars. It is not difficult to pick out 
some very much smaller areas to- 
day where the loss of a total destruc- 
tion would exceed the entire loss in 
1872. 

But the Chief is right when he 
says that nothing is impossible for 
within the year the C. B. & Q. R. R. 
building in Chicago, an office build- 
ing of approved fire resisting con- 
struction, fifteen stories high and 



17 



protected on its exposed side by an 
eighty foot street was subjected to 
tlie heat generated by the burning 
of several low. old-fashioned build- 
ings and was practically gutted of 
the contents of its upper stories in- 
cluding plans and records of the 
railroad which had cost over five 
million dollars to make and as- 
semble. 

With the protection afforded by 
the eighty foot street, it had not been 
thought necessary to use wire glass 
or shutters to protect the window 
openings. The Chicago Chief used 
at this fire only a portion of his de- 
partment but that portion included 
more pumping engines than Boston 
today has altogether and more than 
were probably actively engaged in 
our Great Fire. 

The word "fireproof" as applied to 
a building was a distinct misnomer in 
1872. It is almost as much of a mis- 
nomer today. The best we can ex- 
pect of any building is that it will 
still be structurally sound after 
passing through any heat that it may 
be subjected to from the exterior 
and that any fire starting in the in- 
terior will be confined by the build- 
ing itself to the floor on which it 
originated. In other words, it is 
a building which from its own sub- 
stance will not generate any large 



degree of heat and of a substance 
which can resist without structural 
failure such heat as it may be sub- 
jected to. 

The degree of heat generated by 
a burning building and its contents 
is enormous, literally running into 
the thousands of degrees fahrenheit. 
Your cook will tell you that the oven 
in your kitchen stove never goed 
above a few hundred degrees and 
yet you will find that a piece of pa- 
per put in the oven will be charred 
to a crisp. A fire around one of these 
fire resisting buildings, as happened 
in the C. B. & Q. fire, puts the con- 
tents of the fire resisting building in 
about the same situation as the paper 
in the oven, only with the oven very 
much hotter. 

Fire departments have made tre- 
mendous strides, but it is doubtful 
if they can ever be many strides 
ahead of a conflagration as long as 
the old structures remain in large 
groups. As far as fire-resisting 
buildings in Boston are concerned, 
many of them have a worse ex- 
posure than the Chicago building 
and almost any one of them is liable 
to be put in the situation of Poor 
Dog Tray of nursery fame who was 
whipped because he was in bad com- 
pany. 



The Fire Menace 



By JOHN O. TABER 
Chief, Boston Fire Department 



ON the night of November 
9th, 1872, it was my for- 
tune to have been play- 
ing- in Kingston Street, and 
with my boy companions to 



have seen the fire as it went up 
the elevator shaft. We boys 
ran to Hose 2 on Hudson Street 
to tell them of the fire, and 
helped to drag the hose reel to 



18 



the fire. I remember well of 
seeing the connecting up of the 
line to the hydrant and of help- 
ing to "light up" on the line of 
hose as the pipe or nozzle was 
taken into the alley. Natural- 
ly, as a boy of eight, I little re- 
alized that the day would come 
when I should have the honor of 
being Chief of what I believe to 
be the finest fire department in 
the world. 

I hope that neither I nor any 
of my successors will ever be 
confronted with the problem 
that confronted Chief Damrell 
on that night, but I believe that 
Mr. Decrow is right when he 
says that we are even now, with 
all our apparatus and all our 
men and all our water supply, 
not many strides ahead of a con- 
flagration. We have acre upon 
acre of buildings just as com- 
bustible as were the buildings 
in 1872. We are nowadays 
generally lucky enough to get 
notice of the fires early enough 
and to get the apparatus there 
soon enough to stop fires before 
they assume conflagration pro- 
portions. 

With our motorized depart- 
ment, horse diseases cannot 
affect us, but as Mr. Decrow 
points out, it is the combination 
of unusual circumstances which 
may affect us. The great in- 
crease in the number of motor 
vehicles on our streets may 
some time cause us trouble, and 
delay the apparatus just enough 
to allow the fire to get away 
from us. 

From our point of view, the 
congestion of the streets by the 
great number of motor vehicles, 
both parked and moving, is get- 



ting to be a very serious matter. 
We also have weather condi- 
tions occasionally as we had two 
or three years ago, when the 
great fall of snow kept us at our 
wit's ends to be sure we could 
get apparatus to a fire. These 
are two instances, either one of 
which combined with some oth- 
er seemingly more or less un- 
important happenings might 
make the unusual combination 
of circumstances which would 
let a fire get too far ahead of us. 
The contents of our modern 
buildings are just as combusti- 
ble as were the contents of the 
buildings in 1872, and these con- 
tents can easily be burned by a 
fire from the outside as hap- 
pened in Chicago and in a num- 
ber of other cities. These mod- 
ern buildings do, however, make 
good conflagration stops where 
we could make a stand. Chief 
Damrell did not have them in 
1872. 

If we are ever again unlucky 
enough to have a fire of confla- 
gration size, either in the busi- 
ness or residential sections of 
the city, I cannot urge upon the 
citizens too strongly the neces- 
sity and wisdom of staying at 
their homes or places of busi- 
ness, as the case may be, and of 
protecting the buildings by 
every means possible, whether 
it be wet blankets, buckets of 
water, a garden hose, sand, or 
what not, from the flying 
brands. 

Hovey's building is standing 
today because Hovey's people 
stayed at home and sawed 
wood instead of star gazing and 
depending on an already over- 
wor^-ed fire department. I 



19 



haven't any question either 
that, had all the people of Chel- 
sea stayed at home and watched 
their property, the loss would 
have been reduced a great deal. 
It is human nature to want to 



watch a fire, but when that fire 
begins to spread it is a pretty 
good time to stop watching it 
and to help the fire department 
by watching your own home or 
olace of business. 



A Tragic Night 



By DR. CHARLES W. ELIOT 



ON the evening when the great 
Boston fire of 1872 broke 
out I was sitting by the 
bedside of a young cousin who 
was mortally ill— when the fire 
bells rang. I counted them, but 
did not leave my seat; but when, 
after a short interval, they rang again, 
I rose and looked out of the window. 
A bright and extensive fiery glow 
lighted the sky. I bade my cousin 
goodnight, and left the house at once. 
It was nearly nine o'clock when I ran 
across the Common and down Winter 
and Summer streets, where fire ap- 
paratus was arriving, wagons loaded 
with goods were already trying to 
get northward or westward, empty 
wagons were trying to move in an 
opposite direction, and a great crowd 
of people filled the streets and the 
sidewalks. 

On Winter street I passed close by 
a British Army officer with whom I 
had had some pleasant talk the day 
before. The light from the fire was 
so brilliant that we easily recognized 
each other; and I stopped at his side. 
He spoke first, saying, "Mr. Presi- 
dent, I have been on this street, and 
nearer the fire, for fifteen minutes. 
There is apparently nobody in com- 
mand of your Fire Department, no 



concerted attack on the fire, and no 
guidance is given to the arriving ap- 
paratus. How can this be?" 

I replied that I had only just 
reached the spot, and had seen 
nothing for myself. When he added 
that the fire had already acquired a 
fearful headway, and that there was 
no effective police control of the 
crowds, I could only express my sur- 
prise and mortification. I pressed 
on as far as Pearl street, where I 
could see the crowd, the flames, and 
the futile efforts of a few leading- 
hosemen, who were pouring water nrt 
into the interior of the burning stores 
but on to their granite fronts. 

I remained in the streets nearest 
the fire for an hour or more, long 
enough to see that the fire was rapidly 
eating its way northward toward 
Washington street and eastward to- 
wards State street. In great alarm 
for the College property and records 
I struggled through Devonshire and 
Water streets to Washington street. 
The oflBce of the Treasurer of Harvard 
College was at that time over the 
bookstore of Little, Brown & Com- 
pany on the southerly side of Wash- 
ington street half way between State 
and Water streets. The windows of 
the oflSce looked right over the burn- 



^0 



ing district. I found that the Treas- 
urer, Nathaniel Silsbee, had reached 
the office just before me; and we held 
an immediate consultation as to the 
removal of the records of the Presi- 
dent and Fellows to some safer place. 

Dr. Nathaniel B. Shurtleff, Secretary 
of the Board of Overseers from 1854- 
1872, and a member of that Board two 
years earlier, lived at a house on 
Beacon street close to Tremont 
street; and I knew that he had cor- 
rected many valuable books and 
records. I hastened thither, found 
him on the alert, and very anxious 
and troubled; but he at once assented 
to my bringing the records of the 
President and Fellows of Harvard Col- 
lege to his library, saying that he was 
hoping to make arrangements with 
two friends who owned horses and 
carriages for the removal of all his 
books and papers to a place of 
safety, in case the fire approached 
his house. 

Thereupon Treasurer Silsbee and I 
carried the original record-books and 
most important papers of the Presi- 
dent and Fellows through the turbu- 
lent streets to Dr. Shurtleff's house 
by several trips, and then returned to 
the Treasurer's office to watch the 
progress of the flames towards Wash- 
ington street. I made repeated ex- 
cursions to the immediate vicinity of 
the fire, and witnessed the destruc- 
tion of several valuable stores on 
Franklin and Washington streets 
which belonged to the University. 

In the early morning I discovered 
that a new defense of the north side 
of Washington street had been or- 
ganized, that a considerable group of 
engines, mostly new arrivals from 
towns and cities about Boston, had 
been p'ianted in the rear of the build- 
ings on the north side of the street, 
and were effectively defending that 
row of buildings from Temple Place 



to School street. Happily a com- 
mander had appeared in the person 
of an assistant chief of the Fire De- 
partment. He had acted on his own 
responsibility without orders from 
any superior. 

From the Treasurer's office (the 
building went all the way through 
from Washington street to Devon- 
shire street) Mr. Silsbee and 1 
watched anxiously the progress of the 
fire both eastward and northward. 
The securities held by Harvard Col- 
lege were at that time deposited 
partly in the vaults of the first Safe 
Deposit Company organized in Bos- 
ton (chiefly through the labors of Col. 
Henry Lee), and partly in the Suffolk 
Bank Building at No. 60 State street 
opposite the heavy granite building 
called the Merchants Exchange. This 
latter building had a roof made of 
stone, and was supposed to be fire- 
proof. 

In spite of the efforts of a consid- 
erable number of volunteer helpers 
the flames got into this building 
through windows; and before long the 
roof fell in, some of the volunteers 
who were working on it barely es- 
caping with their lives. Thereupon 
Treasurer Silsbee and I consulted a 
third member of the Corporation, Mr. 
Francis B. Crowninshield, whose office 
was nearby, about removing the se- 
curities of the College from the Suf- 
folk Bank Building to Camb'id°;e. I 
had earlier ascertained through a 
messenger that the Charles River 
Bank in Harvard Square would re- 
ceive the securities of the College. 

Mr. Crowninshield approving, we 
packed all the securities into an old- 
fashioned carpet bag made of carpet 
and leather, which stood nearly three 
feet high when placed on its end, 
and then held a consultation on the 
means of getting that bag to Har- 



21 



vard Square. No private carriage or 
other conveyance was procurable. 

We decided to carry the bag 
through the streets to Bowdoin 
Square, and there take a horsecar 
to Harvard Square. I carried the bag, 
Mr. Silsbee walked beside me on my 
right, and Mr. Crowninshield fol- 
lowed with his right hand holding a 
pistol in the pocket of his coat. In 
about three-quarters of an hour we 
had the satisfaction of depositing that 
bag in the Charles River Bank. 

When we got back to Boston we 
found that the fire had been checked 
on the north side of Washington 
street, had not crossed State street, 
and had been stopped on part of its 
southerly front by blowing up, before 
the fire actually reached them, rows 
of buildings which were obviously to 
be the next victims of the flames. 



This measure was taken on their own 
responsibility by a few ex-officers of 
Massachusetts troops in the Civil 
War with explosives which they 
themselves procured and fired. They 
had earlier sought authority at the 
City Hall to use explosives; but the 
Mayor had not been able on the mo- 
ment to find in the law books at his 
office a safe precedent for authoriz- 
ing such action. I saw nothing of 
this blowing up process — only heard 
about it from friends a little later. 

After walking through several 
streets where the tired firemen were 
at work, and finding that a good 
number of volunteers were giving 
them food and coffee, I again crossed 
the Common to my mother's house on 
Charles street, got some food, and 
took a nap. 



The Business Lessons of 
the Fire 



By FRED I. BROWN 

Brown-Howland Company 



IN the picture on the opposite page 
of the ruins of the building where 
the Great Fire started is a wood- 
en sign stuck in the lamp post which 
reads "A. K. Young & Co." It tells 
us that Mr. Young's firm started bus- 
iness again. 

From Mr. Young's own testimony, 
we know that up to the time of the 
fire the profits for the year had been 
over $30,000.00; that the insurance 
on his stock was far below his losses; 



that he had recently declined to re- 
new one policy on its expiration; and 
that his accounts receivable were 
something over fifty thousand dollars, 
of which all evidence was gone, for 
his safe, had not protected his books. 
He frankly admitted that every time 
he put his books away he knew he 
was taking a chance with an "unsafe" 
safe whose door would not lock. 

When Mr. Young opened up his 
new office, he started with an abso- 



22 



lutely clear desk, without a new or- 
der or the record of an old, and with 
his books of account destroyed. 

Mr. Young's case is typical of doz- 
ens of others, whose testimony at 
the hearings following the fire was 
almost unanimous that their para- 
mount thought as they watched the 
flames wipe out their business or 
raced with them to locations that were 
threatened, was the saving of their 
"books of accounts and records," — 
few of them adequately protected. 

Fifty years have seen almost im- 
measurable improvement in the sci- 
ence of fire-fighting and its tools; have 
seen the fire department raised to a 
profession, and multiplied by hun- 
dreds in men and apparatus; have 
seen insurance recognized as an in- 
dispensable service, as sound a part 
of any business as integrity for on 
it depends the protection of creditors 
and stockholders; have seen the de- 
velopment of the fire-resisting build- 
ing, that like the Postoffice fifty years 
ago, will always do their part in hold- 
ing back the spread of fire; have seen 
the growth of huilding and fire laws 
that mean even better conditions as 
time goes on, and recently have seen 
signs of a sentiment of fire-prevention 
that means not only safety first, but 
the consideration of thy neighbor as 
thyself. 

But these fifty years have also seen 
the narrow streets of Boston, in spite 
of the widening after the fire, grow 
more congested and difficult with the 
relative narrowing by the larger 
buildings and the increase of traffic 
beyond their capacity; have seen 
property values so concentrated that 
the destruction of one block today 
would in many cases exceed the fire 
loss of the whole sixty-five acres of 
the big fire; have seen the taming 
of that great servant, electricity, so 
invaluable in every way, but to whose 



door is laid an amazing percentage of 
the fires of the country; and they 
have seen through the development 
of communication the marvelous con- 
solidations of big business with their 
dependence upon records for any kind 
of successful administration. It is 
the mass and value of these records, 
peculiarly susceptible to fire and 
water, that mark the difference of 
business then and now. 

In today's fires the loss of building, 
equipment, tools and commodities 
may be large, — the loss of time and 
difficulties of operating in temporary 
quarters may be equally large, — but 
the greatest of all losses is the handi- 
caps resulting from the destruction 
of business records. The researches 
and experiments of the past, — agree- 
ments made, — worked-out plans in 
operation, — responsibilities incurred, 
— obligations owed, — obligations due, 
— records, too important to trust to 
memory, these are the big things in 
any business. 

In fact, insurance will cover de- 
stroyed commodities, buildings and 
equipment, will also cover lost time 
and lost profits, and, in some cases 
the new buildings, the up-to-date 
equipment and the latest seasonable 
merchandise, paid for by insurance 
reparation, become a potential gain 
rather than a loss. But vital records 
are practically uninsurable as well as 
unreplacable. 

It may take another fifty years, or 
possibly another "Boston Fire" to re- 
build the old districts of the city, and 
bring our better districts up to some 
uniformity in fire resistance. 

Even then, the Fire Chief's "Noth- 
ing is impossible" would apply to con- 
flagration possibilities in Boston. 

One of the messages of the "Bos- 
ton Fire" is that, in spite of favorable 
wind conditions, it got away from 
control because of a slight delay in 



24 




Courtesy of Brozcn-IIuzchnul Cumpuny 

The alley off Kingston street where the fire started, as it appears today. The 

fire probably had its inception in the basement against the wall of 

w^hich the fire shutter may be seen in the photograph. 



25 



sounding the alarm, a slight delay in 
the arrival of the apparatus, a slight 
delay in surrounding the fire, delays 
that totalled only a very few minutes, 
but those minutes vital and precious. 
Once the delay, wooden roofings and 
copings, and insufficient water for 
such unusual conditions completed 
the combination for destruction. 

It is the story of every big fire, — 
some delay in the beginning combined 
with some unusual condition of wind 
or weather or water, and a Baltimore, 
or a San Francisco, or a Chelsea, or 
a Salem, or an Augusta fire is added 
to the big twins of '71 and '12, Chica- 
go and Boston. 

Boston will always have her nar 
row streets. She will also have her 
occasional high winds and bitter freez- 
ing weather, which sometimes com- 
bine in such furious storms as the 
"Thanksgiving Blizzard," which left 
no vestige of a Portland boat. Mix 
these some night with fifteen to 
twenty vital minutes of delay, and the 
fire department will again need the 
helip of Providence and all her other 
neighbors. 

Another message of the Boston Fire 
is the limitation of building construc- 
tion for fire protection. There are 
many in those days who never 
dreamed that fire could sweep brick 
and granite buildings out of existence 
in a few hours. In fact, there was a 
tradition that the Fire Chief, a few 
weeks before, on his return from a 
visit to the Chicago ruins, had said 
that "Boston could not have such a 
conflagration." This was denied by 
the Chief, and unquestionably was 
never said by him, but it passed cur- 
rency with the indifferent popular 
mind that wanted to believe it true. 

Today men place their faith in the 
new "fireproof" buildings until a day- 
time fire in the Edison plant at 
Orange, sweejps thru a dozen buildings, 



seven of them "fireproof" in less than 
four hours, absolutely destroying their 
contents. Until a fire in Chicago, or- 
iginating in not the worst type of 
low buildings, jumps an eighty-foot 
street, leaps high in the air and with 
its hot breath blows out the windows 
from the ninth to the fifteenth story 
of the C. B. & Q. "fireproof" building, 
and in less than two hours licks up 
everything combustible on these 
floors, including records and their 
containers, with a breath and a tongue 
so hot that metals melting only at 
high temperatures fuse into mixed 
molten balls. 

Another message of the Boston Fire 
is the fundamental but often unap- 
preciated value of records. The testi- 
mony at the hearings brings out 
dramatically "Your fire" is always 
"The fire," and the price of careless- 
ness is exorbitant. In this fire, as 
in many since, carelessness in fire 
preventive measures has thrown a 
suspicion on innocent men that they 
have never been able fully to remove. 
The enactment of the present Mass- 
achusetts Income Tax Law brought to 
the tip of the tongue a word or phrase 
with hitherto little usage "intan- 
gibles." In connection with that law, 
it meant, substantially, negotiable se- 
curities. The same word, though with 
not quite so limited a meaning, should 
be adopted and used far more exten- 
sively than it is with reference to fire 
losses. Every business and profession 
has its intangible assets. Some forms 
of these intangibles can be capitalized 
as for instance "good will," but the 
form most affected by fire losses can- 
not be capitalized, — namely, — the 
books of accounts and records. Ordin- 
arily, the figures for our fire losses do 
not include the loss occasioned by the 
destruction of books and records, and 
yet oftentimes the net loss to the busi- 
ness man from this source is far great- 



26 



er than that suffered from the loss 
of commodities. 

For instance, the stock in trade, so 
to speak, of our insurance companies 
is almost entirely comprised of books 
of accounts and records. The destruc- 
tion of their offices would entail prac- 
tically no loss of commodities, but 
would entail a loss of records which 
form the substance of their business. 
Some of our great department stores, 
if destroyed by fire, would suffer a 
tremendous loss of commodities, and 
imight also suffer a tremendous loss 
of intangibles. With their thousands 
of charge accounts, just imagine what 
confusion and loss would result if 
their records were destroyed just after 
Christmas. 

These are two extreme examples, 
but the same principles apply to a 
greater or less extent to every busi- 
ness and profession. 

In years to come, perhaps during the 
lifetime of men just entering business, 
downtown Boston will be comjposed 
entirely of fire-resisting structures. In 
the very nature of things, however, 
we shall never have fireproof contents, 
so that we shall always have fires of 
greater or less magnitude. 

In fact, our hottest fires are within 
fire-proof buildings, for they are like 
stoves or reverberating furnaces, 
cumulating the heat to extreme tem- 
peratures, and destroying not only 
combustible material, but making 
shapeless forms of metal equipment 
and implements, and even fusing por- 
celain insulators. 



Mr. Young had to take a chance on 
his stock in trade — he lost, but was 
partially reimbursed by his insurance. 
His safe may have been the best avail- 
able at that time, but even then he 
took a chance with a door that would- 
n't lock. But if the safe was the best 
available, we know that it didn't re- 
sist the heat to which it was subject- 
ed, and Mr. Young lost his books for 
which he could not be even partially 
reimbursed by insurance. 

Records, like delicate commodities, 
have fire hazards different from build- 
ing hazards. Of these water is the 
most destructive, and in modern fire- 
fighting, water in superabundance is 
almost the first principle. 

When the Fire Chief planned an 
anniversary exhibition at historic box 
52, he had to caution the department 
to turn off the water as soon as it 
reached maximum height (a matter of 
two or three minutes) for fear of 
flooding the cellars of the neighbor- 
hood. No such consideration would 
be given were the fire a real one, and 
think what it would do to the records 
and valuables in a basement vault 
with the usual two thin metal doors. 

It is significant that in the alley 
where the fire started, almost on the 
identical spot where you would place 
a commemorative tablet, the fire 
shutter that protects it from its neigh- 
bors, and from one of the worst fire 
districts in the city, has rusted or 
broken off its hinges, and has for 
weeks laid against the wall, a me- 
morial tablet to business men's indif- 
ference and forgetfulness in regard to 
fire. 



27 



Progress in Fire Protection 



By THEODORE H. GLYNN 

Fire Commissioner, City of Boston 



ON Saturday, November 9, 1872, 
at 7:24 P. M., an alarm of 
fire was sounded from box 52, 
at the corner of Lincoln and Bedford 
streets. This was followed by four 
additional alarms received in rapid 
succession. These five alarms called 
the entire working force of the de- 
partment to the scene of a fire which 
had started in the basement of a 
granite building at the corner of Sum- 
mer and Kingston streets, occupied 
by Tebbitts, Baldwin and Davis as a 
dry goods store, and A. K. Young, 
hoop-skirt manufacturer. The fire or- 
iginated in the basement and burned 
through the elevator shaft to the up- 
per stories and through the roof. The 
illumination from the fire was seen as 
far away as Charlestown fourteen 
minutes before the first alarm was 
sounded in Boston. 

The fearful fire which resulted was 
the greatest catastrophe which ever 
visited Boston, and in the opinion of 
the officials in charge of the fire de- 
partment in 1872 it was due to the 
unaccountable delay in giving the 
alarm. The report of the commission 
appointed to investigate the cause of 
the fire and the efforts made for its 
suppression states that the fire "raged 
without control till the afternoon of 
the following day (Sunday) spread- 
ing through the best business portions 
of Boston, covering sixty-five acres 
with ruins, destroying 776 buildings, 
assessed at the value of $13,500,000, 
and consuming merchandise and 



other personal property estimated at 
more than sixty millions of dollars." 

The date of this terrible conflagra- 
tion marked an epoch in the history 
of Boston, and, approaching as we are 
the fiftieth anniversary of the disas- 
ter it is truly characteristic of human 
nature that we should review the past 
half century, not with any intention 
of boasting of our good fortune in 
escaping a similar fate, but to find out 
if we have made any real progress in 
preventing the possibility of such a 
catastrophe befalling us again. In 
such a review there is considerable 
opportunity for comparison in fire 
conditions of 1872 and 1922. 

In 1872 the population of Boston 
was only 290,000 compared with ap- 
proximately 825,000 today. The fire 
department at that time was under 
the control of the Board of Aldermen 
and the Common Council. 

As the size of the fire was attributed 
in a great measure to the delay in 
giving notice it is well to consider at 
the beginning the facilities of half a 
century ago and the fire alarm system 
of today. 

The total number of fire alarm 
boxes in 1872 was 164. Today there 
are 1,270 such boxes installed through- 
out the city. The modern boxes are 
known as the "keyless door" type, 
while up to a few years ago the boxes 
were all locked and the keys entrust- 
ed to the care of certain citizens liv- 
ing or doing business in the vicinity 
of the box. The delay resulting from 



28 



the obligation of finding tlie Key be- 
fore sounding an alarm is very ap- 
parent. If the custodian of a key was 
careless, or his home or place of busi- 
ness closed much valuable time was 
lost in searching for some other care- 
taker. All public boxes today are of 
the keyless door type, and delays of 
this character are avoided. 

In addition two or three private 
fire alarm companies are doing busi- 
ness in Boston today. These com- 
panies install private fire alarm sys- 
tems in buildings, and over these sys- 
tems alarms are transmitted to their 
central offices, and thence to the fire 
department. The systems are either 
automatic or may be operated manu- 
ally without delay, thus assuring the 
fire department of prompt notice of 
the existence of a fire. Many poten- 
tial conflagrations have been checked 
in the first five minutes, and in order 
to accomplish this the city of Boston 
has extended its fire alarm system 
commensurate with its growth. 

In 1872 the membership of the de- 
partment comprised a force of ap- 
proximately 475 men, 385 of whom 
were call members, and the other 
ninety permanent men engaged in 
driving and operating the apparatus. 
It was necessary at the time of the 
great fire to enlist the services of ap- 
proximately five hundred additional 
men. The pay roll of the department 
of 1872 amounted to a little over $221,- 
000, while in 1922 approximately $2,- 
400,000 will be expended for salaries. 
Today the department gives employ- 
ment to 1,400 men, twelve hundred 
of whom comprise the actual fire fight- 
ing force. The entire department is 
now on a permanent basis and there 
are no call men. 

In making a comparison of the per- 
sonnel of today with that of years ago 
consideration should be given to the 
type of men in our department at the 
present time. All appointments are 



made from eligible lists established 
after competitive civil service exam- 
inations. In order to pass these ex- 
aminations a man must do consider- 
able studying and also be in first class 
physical condition to pass the rigid 
physical tests imposed on all appli- 
cants for appointment. All promo- 
tions in the department are made in 
an almost similar manner which in- 
duces the men to apply themselves in- 
dustriously and become fully acquaint- 
ed with the duties of firemen in order 
to fit themselves for the examinations. 

In addition the department con- 
ducts schools of different kinds, fre- 
quent drills and inspections, thereby 
maintaining the efficiency of the per- 
sonnel at a high standard. These 
features were unknown fifty years 
ago, and cannot be effectively adapted 
to a call fire department. 

In 1872 the fire department consist- 
ed ipractically of twenty-one engine 
companies, each having a hose reel, 
or "jumper," the steamers being of 
small capacities; ten hose companies; 
seven hook and ladder carriages; and 
three extinguisher or chemical com- 
panies. Of the twenty-one steamers 
in service, six were located in the city 
proper, three in East Boston, three in 
South Boston, three in Roxbury, and 
six in Dorchester. Of the seven hook 
and ladder carriages only two were 
in the city proper. 

Today our fire fighting equipment 
consists of fifty pumping engines, 
three fire boats, thirty ladder trucks, 
three watertowers, one chemical com- 
pany and one rescue company. In 
addition the department maintains a 
good percentage of reserve apparatus 
in first-class condition ready for 
emergency. Practically eighty-five 
per cent of this equipment is motor- 
ized. A pumping engine of today has 
approximately the relative value of 
two of the steam fire engines of fifty 
years ago. 



29 



In 1872 the fire department was 
severely handicapped by an epidemic 
of a horse disease known as "epizoo- 
tic," making it necessary to draw sev- 
eral of the [pieces of apparatus to the 
scene of the fire by hand. It required 
about two hours to concentrate the 
total force of the department at any 
given point in the city in 1872. To- 
day, with motor apparatus, and op- 
erating under a modern assignment 
system, we are able, if necessary, to 
mobilize all our apparatus in any part 
of the city in less than one-half an 
hour. The cities and towns around 
Boston are well equipped with motor 
apparatus, and upon call could as- 
semble their men and equipment in 
almost any part of our city in a very 
short time. 

The fire department carries on sixty 
percent of its apparatus what is 
known as "deck guns" for the purpose 
of concentrating heavy streams. The 
high pressure wagons are equipped to 
operate streams of such extreme cali- 
bre as to penetrate a blaze of the 
greatest magnitude and do effective 
work, where, in the earlier days less 
powerful streams would practically 
feed the flame. 

Water and fire in a controlled state 
are two of the greatest servants of 
mankind today. Either, uncontrolled, 
present a problem and wreck havoc 
wherever they choose to strike. 
Water, applied in proper force and 
volume performs a great service to 
man in checking the ravages of the 
fire demon. When we look back and 
view the situation of fifty years ago 
we are amazed that even greater loss 
did not result from the terrible fire 
that visited the city. 

In 1872 the water service in the 
down-town section consisted of a 
single set of mains, there being a 24- 
inch main in Washington street, from 



which a 12-inch pipe led through Bed- 
ford street, and down to what was 
then known as Broad street, now At- 
lantic avenue. This pipe continued 
on to State street and came up State 
street connecting again to the 24-inch 
main. The district lying inside this 
territory was lined with 6-inch and 8- 
inch pipes, most of which had been 
underground for many years. The hy- 
drants for fire purposes were of an 
old type, with off-sets from the pipes 
on 4-inch pipe, and having but one 
outlet so that but one steamer could 
be connected to a hydrant. In many 
instances the hydrants were many 
hundred feet apart. 

There were also scattered through- 
out the district quite a number of 
underground fire reservoirs supplied 
from the mains by a 4-inch pipe. The 
main in upper Summer Street was 
of the 6-inch type, and without doubt 
was considerably reduced in efficiency 
through rust and inside accretions. 

Today the district is gridironed 
with mains ranging from 36-inch 
feeders down to 8-inch pipes. 
Throughout the greater part of the 
district there are three independent 
systems of mains, namely, the so- 
called low service which furnished 
the general supply of water for do- 
mestic, business and fire purposes; 
the high service which ordinarily 
furnishes water for automatic sprink- 
le'fs, hydraulic elevators, and sim- 
ilar arrangements, but, nevertheless, 
easily and quickly available for 
fire purposes; and the high press- 
ure service of recent installa- 
tion, intended for and devoted en- 
tirely to fire purposes. This latter 
service delivers water at the hy- 
drant at the necessary pressure for 
fire purposes, and when desired makes 
the use of portable pumping engines 
more or less unnecessary. Thus Sum- 



30 



mer street today has all three services, 
a 12-inch low service main, a 12-inch 
high service main, and a 16-inch high 
pressure fire service main. This ap- 
plies in a general way to almost the 
entire district which was burned over 
in 1872. 

The hydrants are now of the mod- 
ern type, with three and four outlets, 
and to a large extent connected di- 
rectly to the main. "Where off-sets are 
necessary they are of much larger 
size than were provided in 1872. To- 
day the hydrants In our downtown 
section are spaced approximately 125 
feet apart. Of course, in some in- 
stances they are much nearer where 
physical conditions govern the loca- 
tion. In the city of Boston today we 
have approximately eleven thousand 
hydrants. 

Insofar as our present high pres- 
sure system is concerned, viewing it 
as an uncompleted system, we can 
easily obtain, at various pressures de- 
livered on a fire from twelve thous- 
and to eighteen thousand gallons of 
water per minute. In 1872, under the 
very best conditions, with the short 
line service under engine pressure, 
the department could deliver about 
forty-two streams, while today, under 
ordinary conditions with 300-foot 
lines, from our pumpers alone we are 
able to supply one hundred and thirty. 

In addition to the protection pro- 
vided by the city by a better fire de- 
partment and increased water service 
there have been many other achieve- 
ments in the past fifty years which 
aid in eliminating the possibility of a 
conflagration in our city. 

The building laws of today define 
the character of construction per- 
mitted in the congested area of Bos- 
ton. In what was the burned district 
the greater percentage of the build- 
ings are known as first-class construc- 
tion. Fire walls are required, as well 
as many other fire stops, which result 



in confining and retarding the prog- 
ress of a fire once started. 

Fire prevention is taking a position 
today along side of fire protection. 
Fires can be prevented as well as ex- 
tinguished. Just as the medical pro- 
fession today is expending every ef- 
fort to prevent disease, so do fire de- 
partments devote considerable time 
and labor in the prevention of fire. 
In the Boston Fire Department today 
we have a division known as the Fire 
Prevention Bureau. Affiliated with 
this bureau are thirty or more inspec- 
tors who are visiting buildings of all 
kinds in all sections of the city daily, 
noting defects, and causing the cor- 
rection of evils. Many of the hazards 
encountered are corrected immediate- 
ly on the verbal request of the in- 
spectors. There are found occasion- 
ally flagrant cases and conditions 
which require money and consider- 
able persuasion to correct. These 
cases require a tremendous volume of 
attention and correspondence, and on 
account of this a force of clerks is 
kept busy at fire headquarters follow- 
ing up and disposing of the recom- 
mendations of the inspectors. The 
citizens of Boston have evidenced a 
willingness to co-operate with the fire 
department in its efforts along fire 
prevention lines and since its incep- 
tion the work of this bureau has been 
very successful. 

In spite of all that has been done 
and is being done Boston has prob- 
lems to contend with which are not 
present in other cities. Our streets 
are narrow and trafl5c is congested. 
It is almost impossible to overcome 
the handicap of our narrow streets, 
but the traffic situation is a matter 
for regulation. Drastic steips should 
be taken to relieve the congestion of 
traflSc in our high value district. Here 
a few moments delay may result in a 
serious loss at any time. One flag- 
rant feature of this congestion is the 
31 



parking of vehicles, particularly of 
the motor driven type, on or adjacent 
to hydrants in such a manner as to 
put the hydrant out of service for 
immediate use. When apparatus re- 
sponds to an alarm of fire and such 
conditions are found, the engines 
must turn about and locate at some 
other hydrant, with the result that 
the most important moment in the 
life of a fire, so far as the defensive 
attack is concerned, are being wasted. 
The co-operation of the citizens is 
needed in correcting this evil. 

Congestion of traffic did not inter- 
fere with the fire department in 1872. 
It has not resulted in serious conse- 
quences as yet. The evil is growing, 
however, and unless checked at once 
may get beyond control and ipresent 
on some vital occasion a difficulty 
that no fire department is in a posi- 
tion to overcome. 

Time and again the question has 
been asked "Could the fire of 1872 be 
repeated in Boston?" The answer is 
that American cities are not fireproof 
in the strict sense of the word. It 
might be well to quote here a state- 
ment made by the present Chief of 
Department to the effect that "any- 
thing is possible." All that is neces- 



sary is an unforeseen combination of 
circumstances, and the entrance of an 
unknown factor in our daily routine." 
It can be said that the fire protection 
provided by the city, and the type of 
buildings erected and being erected 
in the high value section of Boston, 
the possibility of a conflagration 
covering the area of the fire of 1872 
is being reduced to a minimum. 

To point out clearly that great fires 
are still a possibility in our large 
cities attention is called to the fire in 
Chicago on March 15 of this year, 
which resulted in an approximate 
loss of ten million dollars. To ex- 
tinguish such a fire a force of 51 en- 
gine companies, 6 ladder companies, 
7 squad companies, 2 fireboats and 4 
insurance patrols was called upon. In 
pumping units alone this force ex- 
ceeds the entire complement of this 
type of apparatus in Boston. This ex- 
ample is not cited to emphasize the 
fact that there is any great possibil- 
ity of a large fire in our business dis- 
trict, but merely to impress upon the 
minds of the readers of this article 
that it is unwise to rest with absolute 
security in a feeling of safety from 
fire. 



PD i8 1 



h 



82 



PUBLICATIONS DISTRIBUTED BY THE BUREAU 

OF COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL 

AFFAIRS- BOSTON CHAMBER OF 

COMMERCE 



Budgetary Control For Business — 1921 

Practical Experience in Office Management — 1921 

Commercial and Industrial Boston — 1922 

Boston — An Old City With New Opportunities — 1922 

Classification and Definitions of Ledger Accounts — 1922 

Balance Sheets and Profit and Loss Statements — 1922 

The Boston Fire— 1922 



Of the Total Production of the United States 

MASSACHUSETTS MAKES 

70.8% of the Shoe Findings 

54.6% of the Cut Stock 

54.4% of the Textile Machinery 

45.0% of the Rubber Shoes 

40.0% of the Cordage and Jute Goods 

38.5% of the Leather Shoes 

32.6 %o of the Woolen and Worsted Goods 

31.8 %< of the Cotton Goods 

31.4%o of the Cutlery and Edge Tools 

27.4 %o of the Envelopes 

25,4% of the Stationery 

22.4 %c of the Optical Goods 

20.0% of the Tools 

17.1% of the Jewelry 

15.1%) of the Wire 

13.9% of the Finished Leather 

13.3% of the Saws 

11.4 %t) of the Machine Tools 

11.0%o of the Paper and Pulp 

10.8 %P of the ebnfectionery 

10.3% of the Electrical Goods 
















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